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ABSTRACT 
Drums of TRU Waste have been stored at the Savannah River Site (SRS) on concrete pads during the 
1970s through the 1980s. These drums were subsequently covered with plywood, tarpaulins and then 
mounded over with dirt.  Between 1996 and 2000 SRS ran a successful retrieval campaign, and removed 
some 8,800 drums, which were then available for venting and characterization for WIPP disposal. 
Additionally, a number of TRU Waste drums, which were higher in activity, were stored in concrete 
culverts, as required by the Safety Analysis for the Facility.  Retrieval of drums from these culverts has 
been ongoing since 2002. 
This paper will describe the operating experience and lessons learned from the SRS retrieval activities. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Operations at the Savannah River Site routinely generate radioactive waste, including solid and liquid 
wastes. This paper addresses solid waste and specifically Transuranic Waste (TRU waste) that has been 
generated by the process facilities on site. The term TRU waste was originated in 1970 following a 
directive from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to segregate and retrievably store waste having 
transuranic isotopes with atomic numbers greater than 92 and half lives greater than 20 years. This waste 
was termed TRU waste and was required to be retrievably stored in contamination free packages designed 
to last greater than 20 years. 
 
Prior to 1970 no such segregation of TRU waste was performed and this pre-1970 waste is contained in 
Old Radioactive Waste Burial Grounds (ORWBG) at a number of DOE sites and is the subject of national 
policy that is seeking a path to rationalize its treatment / storage, complex wide. Consequently this paper 
does not address the pre-1970 waste and is therefore focused on the retrieval and disposition of TRU 
waste only. It should be noted that unlike the TRU waste this waste is not segregated for transuranic 
isotopes or retrievably stored and therefore represents a very different retrieval scenario.  
 
Since the 1970’s, TRU waste has been generated through execution of national defense programs and 
retrievably stored at the Savannah River Site for eventual disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 
Carlsbad, New Mexico. The waste is contained in steel boxes, 55 gallon drums, 85 gallon drum overpacks 
and drums within concrete culverts, which were placed on concrete slabs called TRU pads. Within the 
Solid Waste Disposal Facility (SWDF) at SRS there are 25 TRU pads. Pads 1-6 were the earliest 
constructed and started to receive waste during the early 1970’s, as the pads were filled they were covered 
with a light sandy soil and then a weatherproof tarp was added and finally they were mounded with a 
heavier loamy soil. The weatherproof tarp and the loamy soil provided protection from water ingress and 
the light sandy soil was placed to facilitate ease of retrieval and entrain any contamination that may have 
egressed from the drums. This practice of mounding the pads ceased in 1985 prior to completing pad 6. 
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Subsequent pads were not placed under earthen mounds and the 55 gallon TRU drums were fitted with 
WIPP NucfilR filter vents. Pads 7 – 13 were open and pads 14 -19 were covered by weatherproof 
enclosure buildings. The uncovered drums on pads 7 through 13 accumulated water from rainfall, which 
penetrated the filter and accumulated in the drums. These drums were radiographed, dewatered and 
moved to covered storage in the early 1990’s.   
All of the drums in temporary storage on the pads contained less than 0.5 PEC (Plutonium Equivalent 
Curies) This is of the order of 8 grams of fissile material per drum. This factor influenced the 
development of the retrieval methodology, because the source term was considerably less than that of 
similar TRU storage sites in other areas of the DOE complex.    
The SRS TRU waste, which is referred to as legacy waste, had grown to over 11,000m3. Although project 
development work had been ongoing since the early 1980’s to develop TRU facilities for processing, little 
or no actual progress had been made. In 1997 however, the TRU program switched gears from just 
continued storage to a multifaceted program designed to begin retrieval and preparation of containers for 
shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad NM. The following activities reflect this 
progress in the TRU program.    
 
TRU WASTE RETREIVAL AND DISPOSAL AT SRS 
 
BNG America, Savannah River Corporation, the operating contractor for the Waste Management Area 
Project at SRS, is responsible for the retrieval and disposal of TRU waste from the pads at SRS. The 
inventory of TRU waste that this project represents can be summarized as 11,650 cubic meters of legacy 
inventory, containerized in the following: 
  
• 30,000 55 gallon galvanized carbon steel drums 
• 2000 large boxes and non-drummed TRU waste containers 
• Containers range in fissile inventory from 0.5 curies to 1,500 curies of weapons grade and heat 
source plutonium. All containers were considered mixed waste based upon the dates they were 
generated. 
• Container storage areas included earthen covered concrete pads containing drums, drums in 
culverts (higher activity) and large boxes, to RCRA regulated fabric covered buildings for 
drums and open storage for culverts and large boxes.  
 
Drum Retrieval/Vent and Purge  
Starting in January 1997 through August of 1999, over 8,800 drums of TRU waste were retrieved from 
earthen covered mounds, inspected vented and purged of radiolytic gases, and re-stored in aisle-spaced 
fabric covered buildings. This was a major project activity, completed two years ahead of schedule, 
eliminating concerns about the condition of these containers, which had been under earthen cover for over 
20 years. Also these containers, all of which were produced prior to 1986, did not have filter vents 
installed in the drum lids.  
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 TRU Waste Drums Before Retrieval                         TRU Waste Drums After Retrieval 
                    
 
Figure.1 TRU Waste Before and After Retrieval. 
  
As part of the retrieval program, all these containers were processed through the Drum Vent and Purge 
system, where radiolytic gas (primarily hydrogen) and other gasses such as methane and volatile organic 
compounds (VOC’s) were vented and a carbon filter inserted to prevent the recurrence of gas 
accumulation. To date some 25,000 drums have been processed through this system (including non-
retrieved drums).  
 
Ship to WIPP program 
In 1998, a Ship to WIPP effort was initiated with emphasis on developing the process, procedures and 
facilities to meet the requirements of the WIPP Acceptance Criteria and the New Mexico Resource 
Recovery and Conservation Act (RCRA) permit. This included the installation of characterization 
facilities including headspace gas sampling and analysis and non-destructive assay and radiographic 
equipment. Existing facilities were modified to accept the TRUPACT-II loading platform. A new facility 
was constructed, the Visual Examination Facility, which provided verification of drum contents identified 
through radiographic analysis.  
 
This facility is another example of “fit for purpose” capability provided at relatively minor cost by using 
existing infrastructure and equipment. All the information gained from retrieving and processing the 
drums prior to characterization was used to develop an Acceptable Knowledge (AK) report that is 
necessary to meet the WIPP shipping requirements. The site was successful in passing a certification audit 
in November of 2000. The first shipment of 42 drums was made on May 8th 2001. Since then, an 
additional 16,000 drums (over 500 shipments) have been made. The site anticipates that the shipment 
numbers will continue to increase with, disposition of all of the legacy TRU waste by 2014.  
 
Early completion of the legacy TRU waste retrieval and shipping mission at SRS by moving this waste 
into safe permanent disposal at WIPP by 2014, twenty years ahead of schedule, represents a saving to the 
taxpayer of approximately $700 million. Subsequently, this brings the scheduled completion date forward 
by 20 years from the original baseline of 2034 to 2014. This has been achieved through adoption of risk 
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informed decision making to accelerate the safe and cost efficient clean up activity. All of this has been 
achieved without a single reportable safety event. 
 
RETRIEVAL ACTIVITIES AT SRS  
 
Planning efforts to retrieve the TRU waste from the earthen mounded Pads 2 through 6 began in the early 
1990’s, pad 1 was not included as it contained heat source waste that was being considered for recycle. 
Planning activities included technology development, hazard analysis and development of regulatory 
instruments and working procedures.  
 
Initial hazard analysis performed during 1994 established process controls and safety significant process 
steps and equipment, predominant hazards were radionuclide contamination egress from the stored drums 
and the potential for build of radiolytic gasses in unvented drums. Risk mitigation was focused upon 
remote operations to protect workers from handling drums containing potentially flammable gasses, the 
use of enclosures and ventilation systems to control contamination. However as initial investigation work 
progressed on the pads the ability to apply a more risk informed approach developed, soil sampling 
indicated very little contamination egress from the drums and drum head space gas sampling indicated a 
lower probability of encountering potentially flammable drums.  
 
The inclusion of field data about the condition of the drums and pads allowed for the removal of 
conservatism in the hazard analysis and definition of a more accurate model for calculating the risk to the 
co-located worker. Consequently, taking a risk informed approach to the development of the hazard 
analysis and flowing it down to implementation of a remediation strategy for the TRU pads allowed a 
refinement of remediation operations to be performed. This removed a number of unnecessary controls, 
Figure 2 shows the initial process steps that were envisaged for remediation of the TRU pads. The final 
strategy employed at SRS, which was based upon the revised hazard analysis resulted in open air 
excavation and handling of multiple drums during an excavation cycle.   
 
The retrieval methodology for the mounded TRU pads was accepted in 1995 and in essence had become 
an extension of routine operations within the solid waste handling area. This was achieved through careful 
analysis of the added risk of the excavation operations and demonstrating that it was simply an extension 
of current burial ground operations and required only minor modification of burial ground operating 
procedures. TRU waste retrieval operations from the pads became incorporated into the Basis for Interim 
Operations, a developmental approach was taken to initiation of operations, particularly the vent purge 
system. The vent and purge system supplied and operated by Nuclear Filter Technology Inc. was based 
upon a LANL system and evaluated as less than a Hazard Category 3 facility, as such it could be 
demonstrated that neither Readiness Self Assessment nor a Operational Readiness Review were required. 
     
Programmatically a number of initiatives were implemented to expose the TRU retrieval project to a 
rigorous review, these included establishing a dialogue with South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control (SCDHEC) to review soil sampling activities for release of the burial grounds, 
establishing an open door policy to allow regulators and stakeholders access to review the project 
documentation at any time and establishment of a national Independent Scientific Peer Review (ISPR) to 
address any concerns raised by the stakeholders and public. The SRS Citizens Advisory Board were 
instrumental in requesting the ISPR address their concerns regarding the TRU waste retrieval program at 
SRS. 
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In summary, it was concluded that the TRU retrieval project presented no additional risk, outside the 
acceptable activities at SRS and the project did in fact address a critical near term safety risk at SRS, 
which was the retrieval and RCRA compliant storage of potentially corroding, buried TRU waste.           
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Retrieval Process Prior to Detailed Hazard Analysis   
 
Scope of the Retrieval Process 
Initially the planned scope was to retrieve 8,800 55 gallon drums from pads 2 – 6, the primary safety 
concerns were drum integrity failure and the potential for explosive gas mixtures in unvented drums. 
Stringent controls were planned in order to mitigate the safety concerns, these included use of a ventilated 
enclosure, only exposing 8 – 16 drums at a time using a remote telescoping arm and only handling one 
drum at a time which would be overpacked and vented as it was removed. It was recognized that the 
controls if applied would significantly extend the schedule and cost of the retrieval operations and 
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therefore an effort was conducted to improve the definition of the hazard and refine the safety analysis 
accordingly.  
 
Improved definition of the hazard presented by retrieval operations could only be defined by invasive 
operations within the pads to determine the condition of the drums. Two techniques were employed, 
firstly ground penetrating radar was used to identify the location of the drum arrays and secondly soil 
sampling was employed to determine the extent of any radionuclide contamination that would be 
indicative of drum integrity failure. 
 
In addition to the intrusive data gathering effort within the pads a comprehensive accident analysis was 
performed using the results of the data gathering effort, this included: 
 
• Drum rupture externally induced 
• Vehicle collision 
• Fire 
• Deflagration due to retrieval activities 
• Deflagration due to vent and purge activities 
• Worst case accident i.e. Tornado / Earthquake 
 
This activity coupled with the safety analysis and independent review findings concluded that a number 
of initially planned project controls and safety related systems were not required and in some case they 
actually detracted from safe operations. These included: 
 
• Unnecessary retrieval equipment was deleted and only one piece of equipment would be 
deployed and that would be a forklift with a drum handling device (grabber)  
• Findings of initial hydrogen concentrations in the vent and purge facility demonstrated a much 
lower frequency of potentially explosive gas mixtures, therefore overpacking all drums was 
deleted. Additionally this decision was supported by findings that showed drum integrity was far 
better preserved than anticipated, with a total of only 113 drums requiring overpacking due to 
compromised integrity. 
• Minimal soil contamination and reduced risk of a drum deflagration allowed the deletion of the 
HEPA filtered containment structure and later the deletion of modular RUBBR  building 
containment. Pads were to be excavated in the open air.     
 
 
Retrieval Methodology 
Information regarding the contents and location of the TRU drums at SRS was contained in the 
Computerized Burial Records Accounting (COBRA) database. The database contains limited information 
on the stored containers (isotopic distribution, generator, date shipped, date received, date placed, dose 
and specific drum number) as well as the location of a drum (given only by grid coordinates of the area). 
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Consequently the exact location of any drum was not precisely known but could be targeted within a grid 
area within the pads.  
 
COBRA data was routinely applied during retrieval operations particularly in the circumstance of an 
unvented, corroded or otherwise suspect drum being identified. Initial retrieval work was performed using 
hand tools to remove soil and plywood and a forklift with a drum grapple was used to handle drums. A 
radiation technician was present during each drum retrieval, to perform contamination and dose rate 
checks as the drum was held by the forklift grabber. Drums were sentenced to interim storage based upon 
condition, dose rate and contamination.  Four operators ran the retrieval operations with responsibility for 
cleaning and labeling drums, attaching bar codes and performing paperwork  
 
Following initial characterization of the mound soils no additional monitoring or pre-sampling was done 
during excavation of the TRU drums. Soil removal posed no hazard increase to workers during the 
handling and movement of TRU drums. Though there was a requirement for coverage by Radiological 
Control Operations while retrieval operations were in progress. The retrieval area at SRS was roped off as 
a Radiation Area. The Radiological Work Permit (RWP) specified that the retrieval pad sites were not 
airborne radioactive areas and they were roped off and marked Radiation Area. Specified PPE was toe 
protectors gloves and safety glasses, operators wore coveralls while conducting retrieval operations. The 
RWP defined worker responses if a contaminated, damaged or leaking drum was excavated. A hand held 
volatile organic carbon (VOC) detector was used at the dig face to “sniff” for VOC’s, an indication of a 
loss of drum integrity.  
 
The drum retrieval rate for the 8,800 drums retrieved from the pads 2 -6 was approximately 40 
drums per 10 hour day. After the bulk of the earth was removed by heavy equipment the drums 
were excavated by an operator using hand tools. The forklift operator then lifted the drum to 
allow an operator to inspect behind and beneath the drum for signs of corrosion or defects. The 
drum was then brought to a central work area in front of the pad where the Radiation Technician 
completed the drum survey. The drum was then examined by an operator in the drum stacking 
area and appropriate paperwork was generated and bar codes applied to drums.  
 
 
Any retrieved drums that had a radionuclide content >0.5 curies (-8.2 grams Pu239 equivalents) of 
TRU radionuclides, dose rate >200 mR contact, surface contamination or evident corrosion 
problems were individually staged for subsequent evaluation and appropriate disposition. Of the 
8,800 drum retrieved from the pads only 12 had corroded and suffered a pin hole loss of 
confinement, requiring overpacking. Minor instances of very low levels of soil contamination 
were located in the vicinity of the compromised drums. 
 
Contaminated soils if encountered were packaged in 55-gallon drums for disposal.  In total only 12 drums 
of contaminated solid were generated, the remaining overburden soil was used as backfill to LLW areas 
and as needed throughout the burial ground, the plywood was disposed as LLW. 
 
Retrieved drums, boxes, and culverts are maintained in RCRA permitted storage with their original 
generator assay values, pending submission into the ship to WIPP campaign. 
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The SRS TRU drum pad storage was only to contain drums with <0.5 curies (-8.2 grams Pu-239 
equivalents) of TRU radionuclides although some drums were found that contained 20 to 30 grams 
Plutonium. All drums containing >0.5 curie TRU radionuclides are stored in culverts. Some of the casks 
and boxes collocated with the drums in the pads had contact dose readings up to 600 mR. These were then 
stored in the Culverts for ALARA reasons. 
 
The overall TRU program operations being conducted today by BNG America Savannah River 
Corporation at the Savannah River Site are represented in Figure 3. Which depicts the retrieval program 
providing the feedstock for the ship to WIPP program 
 
 
Figure 3. SRS TRU Waste Production Process Steps 
 
LESSONS LEARNED  
 
The TRU waste retrieval project was completed in 2002 and all that remains is the pad 1 drums, these 
drums will be excavated and assessed to determine if they meet WIPP disposal criteria for TRU waste, if 
so they will be diverted to the RCRA storage pads. The remaining waste containing high levels of heat 
source plutonium is planned to remain at SRS pending DOE and Regulatory approvals. A number of 
valuable lessons were learned during the retrieval project and these are summarized below: 
 
• Only sixteen drums required overpacking because of drum corrosion, against the anticipated 50% 
that were initially thought to be present. It should be noted during future planning efforts for 
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will add to cost and schedule of the retrieval operation. (over 2,000 drum overpacks were 
purchased and not needed) 
• Retrieval operations were successfully completed in the open air environment with only one piece 
of mechanical equipment, a forklift with a drum “grabber” attachment. There were no instances 
of loose or airborne contamination and no hazardous or flammable gasses were detected during 
retrieval operations.  This clearly demonstrates that prior project planning that targeted the use of 
remote systems within fixed containment were unnecessary and would have added unwarranted 
project cost and schedule. 
• Small, highly trained work crews who developed operational expertise as a learn and repeat 
exercise were able to exceed performance goals by 100 percent. This demonstrates the efficacy of 
deploying skilled workers within clearly defined procedures for the safe and efficient completion 
of challenging industrial and radiological work scopes. 
• Most importantly the project demonstrated the integrity of the 55 gallon drums as interim storage 
containers for TRU waste. Having been stored for nearly a quarter of a century in a wet 
underground environment only 16 of the retrieved drums required overpacking and this was 
because of slight corrosion occurring within the bottom four inches of the drum.   
• In a number of instances the generator values for fissile inventory of the waste drums was found 
to be grossly underestimated, most notably was a drum with 525 g of fissile material that had a 
zero generator value. This not only presents a nuclear safety hazard to operations but in addition 
presents a challenge to the project Authorization Basis.      
 
CONCLUSION 
Rigorous planning and review, involving an open and informed dialogue with stakeholders and the public 
is a key factor in the development of Site remediation work scopes. BNG America Savannah River 
Corporation performed such planning and review activities during development of their TRU waste 
remediation effort at SRS, this resulted in a saving of $700 million and reducing the projected schedule 
for completing the SRS TRU waste mission by over 20 years. 
 
Deployment of fit for purpose technology within a well defined and analyzed safety envelope has been 
shown to be more cost effective and actually contributes to project safety over complex remote 
remediation systems. Investment in the removal of uncertainty in planning of remediation efforts will 
produce significant returns in cost and schedule savings.  
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